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PRIVATE STANDARDS, PUBLIC 
GOVERNANCE: A NEW LOOK AT THE 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
BOARD 
William W. Bratton*
Abstract: The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) pre-
sents a puzzle: How has this private standard setter managed simultane-
ously (1) to remain independent, (2) to achieve institutional stability and 
legitimacy, and (3) to operate in a politicized context in the teeth of op-
position from its own constituents? This Article looks to governance de-
sign to account for this institutional success. The FASB’s founders made a 
strategic choice to create a regulatory agency that sought independence 
rather than political responsiveness. The FASB also set out a coherent 
theory of accounting, the “Conceptual Framework,” to contain and direct 
its decisions. The Conceptual Framework contributed to the FASB’s insti-
tutional success by disavowing a neutral posture, explicitly privileging the 
interests of the users of ªnancial reports (investors and market interme-
diaries) over the interests of the reports’ preparers (large audit ªrms and 
their managers). Nonetheless, the FASB remains vulnerable to the allega-
tion that its complex, rules-based standards serve the audit ªrms’ interest 
in lowering the risk of liability while sacriªcing the users’ interest in 
“fairly” stated ªnancials. This Article endorses the rejoinder position. 
What some see as capture also can be characterized as “responsiveness,” 
and the FASB serves a public interest in taking seriously the accounting 
ªrms’ need for auditable standards. Although detailed rules can distort 
the overall story told by a report’s bottom line, they also make it easier to 
see what preparers are doing, easing veriªcation and making audit fail-
ures and scandals less likely. The FASB emerges as a generator of subop-
timal but institutionally defensible standards. 
Introduction 
 Legal theory has long taught that a clear line divides neither pub-
lic from private law nor the public from the private sector. The legal 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Larry Cunning-
ham, Michael Froomkin, Don Langevoort, Frank Partnoy, and Sid Shapiro for their com-
ments on earlier drafts. 
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realists showed that private law’s most private precincts depend on 
public coercive power and so are not private at all.1 Public choice the-
ory made the converse showing—that public law may be viewed as a 
product of private incentives.2 Recent “new governance” theory draws 
from both of these views to question the tight conceptual connection 
usually maintained among regulatory authority, hierarchical govern-
ment, and public accountability.3 It commends a more relaxed ap-
proach, both reminding us that private actors, properly incented and 
deployed, can regulate successfully,4 and asking us to think of govern-
ance as a cooperative undertaking among public and private actors 
jointly confronting problems needing solutions.5
 Standard setting in particular can involve such public-private 
regulatory cooperation. Government agencies often adopt privately 
generated product standards and industrial codes to take advantage 
of inexpensive, private expertise.6 But such arrangements can trigger 
legitimate objections grounded in public values.7 Standard setters are 
accused of being secretive, industry dominated, and unrepresentative 
of all interested parties.8
 All of these complaints and many more have been leveled at the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”), the private setter 
of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), which the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) imposes on public 
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 589 (1933) 
(contending that contract law, although viewed as “private” in nature, performs essential 
public functions, such as standardizing conduct); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution 
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 470 (1923) (arguing that government 
must inevitably interfere with economic matters). 
2 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 247–73 (1989) (describing government 
output on the assumption that government actors are selªsh utility maximizers). 
3 For overviews of this “new governance” approach, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New 
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lump-
ing, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471, 474–76 (2004) (stressing experimentation and negotiation); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 344–45, 405 (2004) (stressing reºexivity and soft law). 
For an intervention from the “new” school concerning securities regulation, see Christie L. 
Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 757, 819–28 
(2005) (arguing that new governance “inºected” approaches can improve the inherited 
deterrence-based securities law regime). 
4 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate 54–56 (1992) (describing a tripartite regulatory enforcement strat-
egy that employs private interest groups as monitors). 
5 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 548 (2000). 
6 Id. at 640, 642. 
7 See id. at 641–42. 
8 See id. 
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reporting companies.9 The FASB presents itself as an independent, ex-
pert, and neutral body whose standards seek only to make transparent 
the economic reality of reporting companies. Yet, since its founding in 
1973, it has been repeatedly criticized for an excessively private colora-
tion, whether due to capture by managers and reporting ªrms or, al-
ternatively, by the large audit ªrms.10 Others allege the opposite, charg-
ing the FASB with insensitivity to private interests and excessive inde-
pendence.11 Some accuse the FASB of promulgating too many 
standards, others not enough.12 Some complain that GAAP reports 
have become too complex due to overly speciªc, rule-based formula-
tions.13 Others complain that the standards provide insufªcient guid-
ance.14 For some the FASB is too slow and for others it changes things 
too quickly.15
 The complaints are unsurprising.16 When the FASB sets a new 
standard, it intervenes in high-stakes territory.17 Accounting rules im-
plicate the conºicting interests of the ªrms and managers who pre-
pare ªnancial statements (the “preparers”) and the investors and 
                                                                                                                      
9 The SEC is required to establish accounting requirements for public companies under 
§ 19 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The agency de-
termined that it would rely on a private sector standard setter in 1938. See Administrative 
Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No. 4, [1937–1982 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,005, at 72,005 (Apr. 25, 1938). When the FASB 
emerged in 1973, the SEC duly accorded it authoritative status as the generator of GAAP. See 
Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and 
Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973). Following 
a directive of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC restated its formal recognition of the FASB as 
an authoritative standard setter in 2003. See Commission Statement of Policy Reafªrming the 
Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 
8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003). 
10 See, e.g., Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting & Mgmt., S. Comm. on Gov’t Opera-
tions, Staff Report: The Accounting Establishment 1–2 (1976) [hereinafter The Ac-
counting Establishment] (alleging that the FASB dominates the Big Eight public account-
ing ªrms and their clients); Donald J. Kirk, Business and the FASB: The Need for Effective Interac-
tion, Mgmt. Acct., Sept. 1978, at 17, 17 (noting that public sector regulators and agencies 
have suggested that the FASB may not be capable of operating in the public interest). 
11 See Dennis K. Beresford, How Should the FASB Be Judged?, Acct. Horizons, June 
1995, at 56, 60. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See Robert Van Riper, Setting Standards for Financial Reporting: FASB and 
the Struggle for Control of a Critical Process 10 (1994) (describing predictions 
made at the FASB’s inauguration). 
17 See Mohamed Elmuttassim Hussein & J. Edward Katz, Accounting Standards-Setting in 
the U.S.: An Analysis of Power and Social Exchange, 10 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 71 (1991). 
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other ªnancial market actors who rely on the statements (the “us-
ers”).18 A different accounting rule can lead to different resource al-
locations,19 as it impacts, inter alia, stock prices, investment decisions, 
and executive compensation.20 And despite the FASB’s stated objec-
tive to reveal hard economic truth about preparer ªrms, no hard sci-
ence of ªnancial reporting exists to import deªnitive justiªcation to a 
given standard.21 Accounting standards are conventions22 and ªnan-
cial truth is subject to interpretative shading.23 The standard setter, no 
matter how well informed, makes a judgment call.24
 The charges of capture seem plausible at ªrst. Public accountants 
ªll three of the present FASB’s seven seats and corporate executives 
occupy two more.25 With a ªve-to-two advantage, nothing prevents the 
auditors and the corporate audit clients from acting concertedly when 
their interests are aligned.26 But the appearance of capture proves 
deceiving. Neither the coalition hypothesized nor any remotely re-
sembling it has ever emerged on the FASB.27 Observers have intensely 
studied the FASB, but have failed to uncover signs of outside inºu-
ence.28 Although capture has been attempted, the FASB has retained 
its independence, steadily strengthening its institutional position over 
time.29 As it has done so, however, it has not silenced its critics.30
 There emerges a puzzle for those interested in the design of pri-
vate governance institutions: How can a private standard setter simul-
taneously maintain its independence and achieve institutional stability 
while operating in a politicized context, in the teeth of opposition 
from its own constituents? 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
19 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 71. 
20 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
21 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61. 
22 Id. at 57. 
23 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
24 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 57. 
25 See David R. Herwitz & Matthew J. Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers: Mate-
rials 154 (3d ed. 2002). 
26 See id. at 154, 156. 
27 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 60. 
28 See id. 
29 See Ronald King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Institutions and the 
Governance of Incomplete Contracts, 9 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 579, 586 (1994); George 
Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 813, 817 (2003). 
30 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60–61. 
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 This Article looks to “old” governance design concepts to ac-
count for this private agency’s institutional success.31 The FASB’s 
founders made a strategic choice between the two leading models of a 
public regulatory agency: the classical New Deal model of an inde-
pendent expert and the post-war pluralist model of a politically re-
sponsive regulator. They took the New Deal route, structuring the 
FASB to emphasize independence. Because the New Deal model calls 
for a normative goal to channel the agency’s exercise of discretion,32 
the FASB undertook to set out a coherent theory of accounting, the 
“Conceptual Framework,” to contain and direct its decisions and 
thereby to import legitimacy.33 It did not achieve the stated goal, how-
ever: the Conceptual Framework neither determined nor justiªed the 
FASB’s subsequent decisions.34 As a result, the FASB never realized 
the ideal in which agency legitimacy follows ineluctably from the 
combination of independence and expertise.35 But the Conceptual 
Framework nonetheless contributed to the FASB’s institutional suc-
cess by disavowing a neutral posture towards its constituents’ conºict-
ing interests and explicitly privileging the user interest over the pre-
parer interest.36 The FASB has consistently adhered to this repudiation 
of pluralist responsiveness, whatever its public professions of neutral-
ity. Three results have followed. First, the FASB’s general approach 
has been defensible as a matter of economic theory. Second, the 
FASB has faced political opposition from the preparers.37 Although 
this led to occasional political reversals, it also muted allegations of 
capture. Third, the preference for users aligned the FASB’s institu-
tional mission with that of the SEC, its public overseer, importing in-
stitutional stability if not political invulnerability.38 If not ideally le-
gitimate, the FASB has been legitimate enough. 
                                                                                                                      
31 For an important discussion of points of friction arising from the FASB’s fulªllment 
of a public function as a private organization, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking, and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich. 
L. Rev. 291 (2005). 
32 See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 39, 50–51 (1938). 
33 See Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, Acct. Horizons, Mar. 
2003, at 61, 62–63. 
34 See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 830–39. 
35 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60–61. 
36 See Objectives of Fin. Reporting by Bus. Enter., Statement of Fin. Accounting 
Concepts No. 1, § 34 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978) [hereinafter FASB, SFAC No. 1], 
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con1.pdf. 
37 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 75–76, 118–22. 
38 See id. at 141. 
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 The FASB remains vulnerable to a secondary capture allegation. 
Critics charge that its complex, rules-based standards serve the audit 
ªrms’ interest in lowering the risk of liability while sacriªcing the us-
ers’ interest in “fairly” stated ªnancials.39 They contend that “princi-
ples-based” standards would be better.40 The critics have a point. But 
this Article endorses the rejoinder position. What some see as capture 
also can be characterized as “responsiveness.” The FASB serves a pub-
lic interest in taking seriously the accounting ªrms’ need for audit-
able standards. Even as detailed rules can distort the overall story told 
by a report’s bottom line, they make it easier to see what preparers are 
doing, easing veriªcation and making audit failures and scandals less 
likely. In this post-Enron era, scandal prevention arguably takes a le-
gitimate place with transparency as a public-regarding goal for the 
GAAP setter. 
 The FASB emerges as a generator of suboptimal but institution-
ally defensible standards. Part I describes the FASB’s founding and 
subsequent history as an effort to stay legitimate while simultaneously 
maintaining independence and avoiding pluralist subordination to 
constituent interests.41 As means to these ends, the FASB’s organizers 
have drawn liberally on “public” devices in the tool box of administra-
tive process. This ongoing process, which recently climaxed with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),42 has over time embedded the 
FASB in the regulatory framework of American business. Part II shows 
the connection between the FASB’s adherence to the New Deal model 
of the independent, expert agency and the Conceptual Framework’s 
declaration of a goal, “decision usefulness,” favoring the user over the 
preparer interest.43 Part III turns to the standards themselves, taking 
up the rules-versus-principles debate and the subsidiary capture ques-
tion.44
I. Formation, Process, and Structure 
 This Part explains the FASB’s founding and organization as an 
exercise in agency design under the classical expertise model.45 The 
                                                                                                                      
39 See The Lessons from Enron, Economist, Feb. 9, 2002, at 9, 9–10. 
40 Id. 
41 See infra notes 45–212 and accompanying text. 
42 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codiªed in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
43 See infra notes 213–318 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 319–442 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 49–212 and accompanying text. 
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model teaches that it does not sufªce to delegate standard-setting au-
thority to competent experts and then leave oversight to the legisla-
tive principal and the public. The resulting zone of discretion under 
such circumstances will be unsatisfactorily wide, particularly if any 
question arises respecting the standard setter’s independence. Such 
was the problem with accounting standard setters that preceded the 
FASB. The FASB’s founders accordingly attempted to separate the 
standard setter from the preparers, the users, and the accounting pro-
fession. According to the classical theory, however, such a separation 
still will not sufªce to import legitimacy. The independent agent’s ex-
pertise will contain its discretion only if the agency pursues an ascer-
tainable goal. The original FASB sought to put itself inside the model 
by articulating a Conceptual Framework for accounting. 
 Many found the design intrinsically inªrm, however. From a pub-
lic choice point of view, independence and expertise prevent neither 
empire building by the agency nor capture by the regulated interest. 
From a public interest point of view, the classical model leads to in-
sensitivity to public demands and so cannot legitimately be employed 
with private actors. The FASB, sticking to the classical playbook, sur-
vived attacks from both points of view. But it also reformed itself over 
time, taking on more and more of the procedural earmarks of a pub-
lic institution. Section A describes the FASB’s founding and design.46 
Section B describes the criticisms leveled against it.47 Section C de-
scribes its subsequent organizational evolution.48
A. Foundation and Design 
1. Antecedents and Founding 
 Institutionalized standard setting came to accounting in the wake 
of the enactment of the federal securities laws,49 which directed the 
SEC to prescribe the form and content of ªnancial statements.50 The 
SEC went back and forth on what to do about the matter for several 
                                                                                                                      
46 See infra notes 49–130 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 131–164 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 165–208 and accompanying text. 
49 Previous initiatives had been small scale and applied only to selected industries, and 
so left conºicts unresolved. Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 72; see also Fed. Reserve Bd., 
Uniform Accounting 5 (1917). 
50 See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. For a review of the 
legislative history, see Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants 
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 798–820 (2004). 
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years,51 ªnally determining in 1938 to delegate the job of providing 
“substantial authoritative support” for accounting treatments to the 
accountants’ professional organization, the American Institute of Ac-
countants (the “AIA”) (later the American Institute of Certiªed Pub-
lic Accountants (the “AICPA”)).52 The AIA responded in haste, creat-
ing the Committee on Accounting Procedure (the “CAP”).53 This 
committee was made up of twenty-one part-time, geographically dis-
persed members, most of whom were certiªed public accountants 
(“CPAs”).54 The committee also included a few academics,55 as well as 
a two-member staff.56 The AIA assigned the CAP a limited mission: to 
recommend acceptable standards by drawing from the wider menu of 
prevailing practices, rather than to set new standards.57 Preparers 
were not compelled to adopt them and the CAP was ºexible about 
available alternatives.58 The CAP’s constituents, however, disliked this 
ad hoc approach, demanding more uniformity and speciªcity.59
 In 1959 the AICPA dissolved the CAP and substituted a new 
committee, the Accounting Principles Board (the “APB”), which sur-
vived until 1973.60 The APB’s twenty-one part-time members included 
preparers and users in addition to CPAs and academics.61 It also had a 
research staff.62 But the APB satisªed neither the preparers nor the 
audit profession.63 Those were Wall Street’s “go-go” years, and the 
ºow of new accounting issues outstripped the APB’s capacity.64 Reve-
nue recognition problems, off-balance-sheet leases, and the new in-
vestment tax credit all triggered controversy.65 Worse, the APB was 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Robert Chatov, Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Con-
trol? 111–32 (1975). 
52 See Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. Public/Private-Sector Approach to the Regula-
tion of Financial Reporting, Acct. Horizons, Mar. 1995, at 52, 55. 
53 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7. For a history of the CAP, see Chatov, supra note 
51, at 133–52. 
54 Zeff, supra note 52, at 55–56. Note that Chatov states that there were eighteen mem-
bers on the committee. Chatov, supra note 51, at 196. 
55 Zeff, supra note 52, at 55–56. 
56 Chatov, supra note 51, at 134. 
57 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7. 
58 Chatov, supra note 51, at 134; King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 584. 
59 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7; King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 582–83. 
60 For a history, see Chatov, supra note 51, at 195–233. 
61 Zeff, supra note 52, at 56. 
62 Chatov, supra note 51, at 196. 
63 See id. at 197–99; Van Riper, supra note 16, at 8. 
64 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 7. 
65 Id. at 57–59. 
2007] A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board 13 
seen as dominated by large accounting ªrms.66 To some, this implied 
preparer capture, as the CPAs yielded to pressures from their cli-
ents.67 But the preparers did not get all the treatments they wanted; in 
fact, they complained of underrepresentation.68 The APB also was 
charged with developing a fundamental accounting theory—a con-
ceptual framework to guide its standard setting.69 But it made little 
progress there as well.70 Indeed, the project came to an end when its 
staff produced its ªrst Accounting Research Study recommending 
radical departures from cost accounting.71 The APB itself rejected the 
initiative.72 In the end, the APB’s failure to promulgate a timely stan-
dard to govern mergers exhausted the patience of the large accounting 
ªrms.73
 In 1971, the AICPA convened a conference of auditors, prepar-
ers, and users that appointed two study groups to consider what to do 
next.74 A follow-up conference considered and endorsed the study 
groups’ recommendation that the standard setter remain private, so 
as best to draw on private sector expertise and avoid susceptibility to 
political pressure.75 But, on this third try, the conference participants 
decided that the standard setter’s structure should not only guarantee 
independence, but also assure better constituent representation.76 
Thus did the FASB emerge in 1973 out of a series of private negotia-
tions among representatives of its various constituents.77 The SEC 
quickly accorded it authoritative status.78
2. Design 
 Independence meant formal separation from constituent groups, 
so the primary structural change occurred at the top.79 The standard 
setter was pulled from the AICPA and reorganized under the Financial 
                                                                                                                      
66 Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 73. 
67 See id. 
68 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 8. 
69 See id. at 7. 
70 See id. 
71 See King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 583. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9. 
76 Id. 
77 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 76. 
78 See Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Prin-
ciples and Standards, supra note 9. 
79 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9. 
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Accounting Foundation (the “FAF”), an independent not-for-proªt en-
tity.80 The FAF’s nine trustees were to come from ªve sponsoring or-
ganizations, representing CPAs, preparers, users, and academics.81 But 
the accounting profession did not cede a position of primary inºu-
ence—the AICPA had a majority of ªve seats.82 The FAF’s (and thus the 
FASB’s) funding came from contributions from the participating pro-
fessional organizations, the large accounting ªrms, and preparers.83
 A board comprised of seven full-time members appointed by the 
FAF trustees replaced the part-time, dispersed, and dysfunctional APB 
board of twenty-one.84 This new structure enabled the board to act 
more quickly. The seven members were to sever their connections 
with their employers, divest their investments, and go on salary for 
ªve-year terms (with possible reappointment).85 Four of the seven 
members were required to be CPAs; the others were to be “well versed 
in problems of ªnancial reporting.”86 Voting was to proceed on a ªve-
to-two supermajority basis.87 Rules of Procedure, ever since referred 
to as the FASB’s “due process,” were to be adopted and followed.88 
Independence also meant distance from constituents and politicians, 
so Connecticut was chosen as the venue over New York or Washing-
ton.89 Finally, for the founders, independence also implied secrecy.90 
The original FASB met in private prior to the publication of a new 
standard’s Exposure Draft.91 Member dissents were not published.92
 Constituent responsiveness was addressed, if not assured, through 
the establishment of an advisory body, the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Advisory Council (the “FASAC”), appointed by the FAF and 
                                                                                                                      
80 See id. 
81 Id. at 14. The sponsoring organizations were the AICPA, the American Accounting 
Association (educators), the Financial Analysts Federation (now the Association for In-
vestment Management and Research), the Financial Executives Institute, and the National 
Association of Accountants. Id. The Securities Industry Association joined a few years later. 
Id. 
82 Id. Three of the remaining seats were to come from the preparers and users; one 
was to be an academic. Chatov, supra note 51, at 5. 
83 See Nanette Hagood & Ray G. Stephens, A Guide to Standard Setting Bodies, Ohio CPA 
J., Aug. 1995, at 44, 44. 
84 See Chatov, supra note 51, at 233; Zeff, supra note 52, at 56. 
85 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 17. 
86 Chatov, supra note 51, at 5. 
87 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 87. 
88 Id. at 18. 
89 Id. at 13. 
90 See id. at 18. 
91 Id. 
92 King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 586. 
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overseen by the chair of the FASB.93 The FASAC would contain 
twenty-seven members representative of the constituent groups and 
possessing skills valuable to the FASB;94 the SEC’s Chief Accountant 
also was to be a member.95 It was to consult with the FASB on policy 
issues and technical matters, so as to help it prioritize, set agenda 
items, and keep things moving.96 Although it has always been rele-
gated to an advisory role, the FASAC has fulªlled these duties and 
never hesitated to criticize the Board.97
 The FASB’s founders, then, wanted the new standard setter to be 
independent yet responsive to constituent interests.98 In addition, 
they wanted the FASB to remain insulated from political pressure.99 
But they left one problem unresolved. As they saw it, the new agency 
had no substantive mandate on which to draw in drafting stan-
dards.100 The constituents needed to come to a basic agreement, if 
not on the terms of particular standards, then at a more general level 
on the substantive mission of the enterprise.101 The founders left this 
constitutional task to the agency itself.102 The early FASB responded 
with the Conceptual Framework, a series of statements intended to 
provide a uniªed theoretical basis from which to articulate standards, 
stressing ªnancial statement reliability, comparability, and relevance 
to users.103
                                                                                                                      
 
93 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 17. 
94 Id. In 1975, the FASAC was comprised of six members from large audit ªrms, ªve 
from corporations, eight from the ªnancial sector, three academics, two lawyers, two from 
government, and a former SEC chief accountant. Chatov, supra note 51, at 5. 
95 Chatov, supra note 51, at 5. 
96 Id. at 234. 
97 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 17; Hagood & Stephens, supra note 83, at 44; King & 
Waymire, supra note 29, at 597. 
98 See Chatov, supra note 51, at 232–39; Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9, 17. 
99 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 9. 
100 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 The FASB’s original deliberations led to six statements. See generally Elements of 
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3. The FASB and Agency Theory 
 The structural succession of the CAP to the APB to the FASB re-
ºects the twentieth-century evolution of thinking about administrative 
agency design. Originally, agency discretion was not seen as problem-
atic.104 In Richard Stewart’s phrase, agencies were conceived as “trans-
mission belts” that implemented legislative directives.105 All one needed 
was an expert acting within his or her zone of competence and appro-
priate results would follow, with legislative oversight, bureaucratic struc-
ture, and popular opinion sufªcing to assure compliance with legisla-
tive directives.106 For instance, both the CAP and the APB operated on 
the assumption that standard-setting problems could be addressed 
adequately simply by applying professional expertise.107
 But more was needed to justify the delegation of rule-making dis-
cretion to agencies. Thus did the New Dealers restate the theory of 
the administrative agency to stress the interplay between the legisla-
tive mandate and the agency’s expertise.108 If the agency’s goal was 
stated explicitly, the regulator’s expertise solved the discretion prob-
lem.109 Agency rule making became a trial and error process of apply-
ing neutral, expert knowledge to realize the stated goal.110 The rules 
emerged as a function of the expertise and the state of the world, 
supported by objective bases.111 Thus generated, they could not be 
arbitrary. With the Conceptual Framework project inherited from the 
APB, the FASB drew on this approach, seeking to justify its independ-
ent exercise of discretion by articulating generally accepted goals that 
would determine speciªc accounting standards.112
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 The post-war critique of the New Deal expertise model also inºu-
enced the structure of the FASB.113 Practical experience led to ques-
tions about the agency experts’ independence.114 Critics charged that 
the experts unduly favored the interests of regulated parties—the 
same allegation of capture that had impaired the APB’s credibility.115 
The FASB’s founders sought to cure this problem through formal 
separation from the accounting profession.116 The FASB’s due process 
regime similarly mirrored the standard public law palliative for cap-
ture problems—containment of agency discretion through process 
rules.117 Agencies also had come to be seen as prone toward overregu-
lation, ever more elaborating their systems of controls.118 The FASB 
therefore established a built-in advisory board that was assigned the 
job of overseeing its agenda.119
 The FASB’s founders drew the line when it came to a more fun-
damental objection to agency authority. The expertise model only 
works if there is a general consensus on the stated goal.120 Its critics 
destabilized that assumption by questioning the very existence of an 
objective public interest available to channel and contain agency dis-
cretion.121 Under this pluralist view, agency rule making becomes a 
legislative and political process of balancing conºicting constituent 
interests in light of a legislative directive.122 It follows that legitimacy 
under this view depends on the agency’s political responsiveness—the 
governance structure must afford interest groups a forum and assure 
consideration of their views.123 And the more responsive the agency, 
the less serious the capture problem.124 Agency design becomes a mat-
ter of mediating tensions under this view because the pluralist ap-
proach, carried to its logical conclusion, negates the independence 
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model.125 The agency, albeit expert, merely functions as an aggregator 
of outside preferences.126 This makes private standard setting particu-
larly problematic, for such a political process arguably should be con-
ducted in the public sector.127
 If the FASB’s founders perceived this problem they did not admit 
it, because admission would have implied the abandonment of the 
enterprise and the remission of the standard-setting function to the 
SEC. The FASB’s existence stemmed from its private constituents’ de-
sire to avoid the political and ªnancial risks attending such a surren-
der of control.128 So averse were they to a public outcome that they 
proved willing not only to vest agenda control in a nominally inde-
pendent board, but also to pay for its expenses. 
 The FASB’s founders, then, implicitly denied the pertinence of 
the pluralist critique, instead insisting on the New Deal expertise 
model’s suitability and designing a board that would be responsive as 
a matter of process. The FASB founders felt no duty to balance con-
stituent demands, which made the Conceptual Framework project’s 
successful completion all the more important. With the Framework 
up and running in a context of general consensus, the FASB would 
perfectly embody the expertise model.129 It would be a legitimate neu-
tral actor rather than a political actor in an interest group game.130 
Things would not work out as projected, however. 
B. Public and Private Reproaches 
 The FASB, charged with making the New Deal model work in a 
private standard-setting context, undertook its task at an unpropitious 
time.131 The Wall Street “go-go” years ended abruptly in 1973, and 
were followed by a spate of scandals.132 Shortcomings in accounting 
standards received some of the blame for these scandals, which put 
accounting on the Congressional reform agenda.133 At the same time, 
the New Deal agency model was being intensely criticized from oppo-
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site sides in public policy debates.134 Progressives wanted more public 
responsiveness, while public choice commentators dismissed the whole 
agency project as a means to the end of private rent seeking.135 The 
FASB faced both attacks as it went forward under the banners of rele-
vance, reliability, and informational neutrality.136
1. Public Interest 
 The founders’ project of cabining the FASB in the New Deal 
model did not lack irony. In the eyes of progressive critics, the whole 
enterprise resulted from a typical agency malfunction by a leading 
exemplar of the New Deal legacy—the SEC.137 The critics made a 
powerful case. It was clear to everybody that choices of accounting 
principles had signiªcant allocative consequences, whatever the ac-
counting profession’s position as to whether GAAP followed from ob-
jective determinants and led to objective truths.138 Neutral and trans-
parent accounting principles did not exist.139 A political characteriza-
tion of the enterprise followed: accounting standard setting was a 
high-stakes game in which the setter had no alternative but to balance 
interests.140 And, to the extent the standard setter resolved political 
rather than technical issues,141 its legitimacy depended on political 
responsiveness.142 It followed that independence was not a virtue, but 
a guarantee of irrelevance, isolation, and unaccountability.143 The 
public interest was at stake and a responsible public body had never 
even made a considered decision on the matter.144 The time had 
come to vest standard-setting authority in an agency directly responsi-
ble to Congress.145
 Nor, in any event, could the FASB be considered independent.146 
It depended on contributions from the preparers and auditors, 
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groups with high stakes in all of its outcomes.147 A government board 
would do a better job of weighing the costs and beneªts.148
 This public interest position got a public airing in Congress in 
1976 when Senator Lee Metcalf’s Committee on Government Opera-
tions held hearings and issued a blistering report.149 The SEC, the 
Committee said, had delegated the standard-setting function to special 
interest groups, in particular the Big Eight accounting ªrms, which en-
joyed disproportionate representation on the FAF and the FASB in ad-
dition to controlling funding and stafªng.150 To restore public 
conªdence, the General Accounting Ofªce needed to take over the 
function, the SEC having disqualiªed itself in the matter.151 Actors from 
the FAF and the FASB made their ªrst trip to Washington to defend 
themselves at subsequent hearings.152 Happily, things quieted down by 
the time a bill ªnally reached the House ºoor.153 The bill, which never 
reached a vote, would only have required the SEC to set the FASB’s 
agenda, impose a timetable, and intervene with its own standards if the 
FASB were slow or issued unsatisfactory standards.154
2. Public Choice 
 Public choice theory explains the behavior of public actors in 
terms of private incentives.155 Agencies become the targets of rent-
seeking interest groups, the agencies themselves constituting just an-
other interest group.156 Thus depicted, the agencies serve the de-
mands of the groups while expanding their own operations and power 
bases.157 During the FASB’s early years, public choice theorists applied 
their considerable critical acumen to a new description of the evolu-
tion of accounting standards.158
                                                                                                                      
147 See id. 
148 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 60. 
149 See generally The Accounting Establishment, supra note 10. 
150 See id. at 1–2. 
151 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 45. 
152 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18. 
153 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 45. 
154 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18. 
155 See Freeman, supra note 5, at 561–62. 
156 See id. 
157 See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efªcient Accounting Policy, 63 Acct. 
Rev. 1, 11 (1988). 
158 See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Accounting 
Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 Acct. Rev. 273, 277 (1979). 
2007] A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board 21 
 The public choice theorists’ description follows from a picture of 
an unregulated economy in which managers have high-powered repu-
tational incentives to disclose ªnancial information voluntarily.159 
Given those incentives, accounting practice evolves so as to reduce 
agency costs if left unregulated.160 Reporting practices vary with the 
context, depending on capital structure, monitoring costs, size, dis-
persion, and complexity.161 In contrast, in a regulated economy, indi-
viduals compete to use the government’s coercive power to transfer 
wealth to themselves, arguing that the transfer is in the public interest 
to justify the results.162 Mandated accounting treatments serve just 
this purpose, as vested interests compete over them using neutrally 
phrased terms.163
 Under this public choice reading, the standard-setting enterprise 
is intrinsically inªrm so long as the standards are mandated. If there 
are mandated standards, very little difference lies in the choice be-
tween a public and private agency—the FASB and the SEC both are 
seen as bad entities because they operate a mandatory disclosure sys-
tem. The solution lies in the mandate’s removal. At that point a pri-
vate standard setter need not be a bad thing, for its existence and ro-
bustness would depend on free choices made by preparers and users. 
 Although this view has negative implications for the legitimacy of 
the FASB, the political implications are marginal.164 The capture alle-
gation made by the FASB’s progressive critics is echoed, but not repli-
cated, by public choice theorists. Here, capture implies wholesale de-
regulation with a consequent sacriªce of uniformity, not to mention 
total reliance on market correctives to align preparer incentives. The 
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FASB has faced more immediate problems in making its case for le-
gitimacy. 
C. Institutional Evolution 
 The FASB and the FAF have been tinkering with their process 
and structure ever since the Metcalf Report slapped down the charge 
of capture and posed a pluralist alternative.165 The changes have al-
most uniformly pushed the FASB in the direction of greater public 
responsiveness.166
1. Structural Modiªcations 
 The process started with a FAF review in the immediate wake of 
the Metcalf intervention.167 The review led to measures that further 
separated the FASB from the large audit ªrms. Contributions from 
any single ªrm were capped at $50,000 or one percent of the FASB 
budget.168 The requirement that four of the seven board members be 
CPAs also was eliminated in favor of a weaker requirement that mem-
bers have knowledge of accounting, ªnance, and business.169 The su-
permajority voting requirement was replaced as a result.170 The ªve-
to-two rule followed from a desire to prevent the appearance of a 
dominant CPA voting coalition.171 With the removal of the CPA ma-
jority, a simple majority rule sufªced.172 In addition, the AICPA lost its 
veto over the selection of FAF trustees.173 Sole nominating power was 
instead vested in a committee of representatives from the FAF’s spon-
soring organizations.174 The FASAC received an independent chair 
and an expanded role.175 Finally, sunshine replaced secrecy, as pro-
ceedings were opened and dissents and other records made public.176 
Future plans were to be published in periodic reports.177
                                                                                                                      
165 See The Accounting Establishment, supra note 10, at 1–2, 20–24; infra notes 167–
197 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 167–197 and accompanying text. 
167 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 46. 
168 Id. at 88. 
169 Id. at 86–87. 
170 Id. at 87. 
171 Id. 
172 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 87. 
173 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 19. 
174 Van Riper, supra note 16, at 86. 
175 Id. at 47, 87. 
176 Id. at 86. 
177 Id. at 46–47. 
2007] A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board 23 
 Thereafter, the FASB became a larger organization, mostly 
funded by the proceeds of its own publications.178 More staff en-
hanced its ability to meet constant demands for “timely guidance” 
with technical bulletins.179 In 1984, it formed a subsidiary organiza-
tion to address interpretive questions arising under existing rules.180 
This Emerging Issues Task Force has ªfteen seats, ten of which are 
ªlled by partners from accounting ªrms.181 Preparer representatives 
take three seats, and, signiªcantly, three votes sufªce to block a de-
termination and force the matter to the FASB’s agenda.182
 Preparer demands rose to the fore in the 1980s.183 They wanted 
better representation on the FASB itself and got it in 1985.184 From 
then on, the FASB would be comprised of three CPAs, two representa-
tives from preparers, one user representative, and an academic.185 
That same year, the AICPA ceded its ex ofªcio trustee seat on the FAF 
to a preparer representative.186 In 1990, preparer complaints about 
standards overload led to the reimposition of the ªve-to-two superma-
jority rule.187
 The AICPA thereafter continued to fade from the picture, 
strengthening the FASB’s independence.188 The AICPA lost its major-
ity of FAF seats when it emerged with ªve of the sixteen trustees in 
1993.189 In the wake of Enron and SOX, the AICPA also left the busi-
ness of issuing authoritative accounting guidance for registered com-
panies.190 Interestingly, in 2002, the FAF took the occasion of the ex-
ternal shock of scandal to change the FASB’s voting rule back to the 
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four-to-three simple majority.191 In the post-Enron environment, the 
need for speed once again trumped the preparers’ interest in agenda 
control.192
 The FASB’s ªnal and most emphatic move to the public side of the 
street occurred with the enactment of SOX in 2002.193 SOX changed 
the framework of federal recognition of GAAP, requiring that a recog-
nized standard setter be wholly funded by fees levied on reporting 
companies by the federal government.194 The FASB duly applied for 
recognition.195 Upon the SEC’s approval of the application, the FASB 
became publicly funded and ceased collecting contributions.196 Tech-
nically speaking, it is no longer beholden to its constituents.197
2. Empirical Studies 
 The FASB attracts a great deal of academic attention. Its trans-
parency and shifting voting rules,198 along with the allegations that it 
has been captured,199 make its proceedings an ideal subject for social 
scientists armed with statistical methodologies. Studies have looked 
for connections between the members’ votes and prior afªliations, 
and found nothing signiªcant.200 Nor have any dominant voting coali-
tions of former auditors or preparers appeared,201 although some two-
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member voting pairs do show up in the data.202 (Here a caveat must 
be noted—any coalition activity respecting selection of agenda items 
is unobservable.203) The studies also have shown that the voting rules 
matter: more standards get set under the 4–3 rule than under the 5–2 
rule, with the supermajority signiªcantly slowing the time to promul-
gation.204 Finally, self-interest clearly motivates commenting compani-
es205 and lobbying impacts the terms of the standards.206 However, the 
FASB has done fairly well with respect to resisting undue inºuence by 
the large accounting ªrms.207 In fact, one study has concluded that 
the FASB has not been captured, at least in any empirically veriªable 
sense.208
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D. Summary 
 Although the FASB’s structure has been modiªed to assure more 
public responsiveness, there has been no break with the classical in-
dependence model.209 Indeed, compared to the SEC, the FASB ar-
guably remains the more independent agency. The political branches 
of the federal government state the mission and select the members 
of the SEC. With the FASB, on the other hand, the political branches 
only wield veto power—they can put it out of business or they (or 
their SEC nominees) can selectively reject its output, but they other-
wise do not control it.210 The FASB emerges in a position similar to 
that of many public agencies: regulating within the parameters of 
stated goals, remaining subject to loose oversight from political 
higher-ups, and taking private preferences into account without per-
mitting them to determine results.211
 We have seen the FASB maintain apparent independence, deºect 
a pluralist challenge to its legitimacy, survive, and prosper. It has done 
all of this against a background of constant complaint. Critics have 
accused the FASB of excessive delay, excessive complexity, and exces-
sive reliance on rules throughout its history.212 The question as to the 
FASB’s legitimacy accordingly remains to be answered. 
II. Decision Usefulness 
 This Part focuses on the Conceptual Framework’s designation of 
the users as the interest to be served, a choice that had as much to do 
with the creation of a viable agency framework as with the articulation 
of a coherent accounting theory.213 For the New Deal model to work, 
the FASB needed a focused goal.214 To get one, it broke with past ac-
counting theory to raise external transparency— “decision usefulness” 
for the users—over internal control as the system’s goal.215
 This has had three consequences. The ªrst is substantive legiti-
macy, discussed in Section A.216 The user tilt makes plausible the 
FASB’s claim to legitimacy as an independent expert. The goal of deci-
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sion usefulness is generally accepted as a policy matter and makes sense 
as a matter of economic theory. It aligns the FASB with information 
economics, which affords the most cogent justiªcation for a central-
ized, mandated standard setting for ªnancial reports. Section B ad-
dresses the second consequence: with decision usefulness, the Concep-
tual Framework embeds a normative preference for one of the FASB’s 
leading private constituents, users and markets, over the other, prepar-
ers and managers.217 Although this caused constant and costly political 
problems, it also yielded ancillary beneªts. User support, or at least ac-
quiescence, counterbalances management opposition. At the same 
time, no one can accuse the FASB of being a corporate tool. It instead 
amounts to a subagent of its public agency government overseer, the 
SEC. Section C takes up this agency relationship.218 The SEC’s delega-
tion of standard-setting authority to the FASB for the most part has 
served its own public purposes in a cost-effective manner. 
A. The Conceptual Framework, Decision Usefulness, and Policy Legitimacy 
 The Conceptual Framework is widely regarded as a theoretical 
failure, particularly with respect to the critical topic of revenue recog-
nition and measurement.219 It did not silence critics who contend that 
standard setting for ªnancial reports implies a political choice be-
tween competing constituent interests.220 Nor did it succeed in de-
termining the results of standard-setting exercises.221 Actors at the 
FASB defend it with faint praise as a useful exercise in philosophical 
discipline222 or a “relatively consistent body of standards” to which the 
FASB “pay[s] attention.”223 And, to the extent that the Conceptual 
Framework’s precepts actually have shaped the FASB’s standards, crit-
ics charge that they skew results toward formalism and artiªciality and 
sacriªce ºexibility and responsiveness.224
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1. Decision Usefulness 
 Some assert that the Conceptual Framework accomplished one 
important thing,225 set out in a single unprepossessing sentence in 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: “Financial report-
ing should provide information that is useful to present and potential 
investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, 
credit, and similar decisions.”226 This concept, known as “decision use-
fulness,” seems like an obvious point, but it was controversial when 
promulgated in 1978.227 Only thirty-seven percent of the comments 
received on the point were favorable, and sixty-one percent of the 
comments came from preparers.228
 The objecting preparers had their reasons for opposing the pro-
vision in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1.229 Finan-
cial reporting in fact serves two purposes: it provides external trans-
parency and serves as a part of a rational system of internal manage-
ment.230 Historically, both purposes had been bound together under 
the rubric of “stewardship,”231 which emphasized the manager’s duty 
to maintain the value of assets in addition to its duty to report results 
to owners and creditors.232 The value-maintaining preparer was seen 
as a user and accorded an equal place at the table with owners and 
creditors.233 Indeed, management asserted that stewardship implied 
its own primacy, positing a community of interest between itself and 
the ªrm's long-term shareholders as against an outside ªnancial mar-
ket made up of speculators looking to turn quick proªts.234
 The Conceptual Framework, even as it paid lip service to the 
stewardship concept,235 broke with history by removing management 
from the group of recognized users.236 Although the Conceptual 
Framework asserted that the “role of ªnancial reporting requires it to 
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provide evenhanded, neutral, or unbiased information,” neutrality 
concerned only the usefulness of information reported.237 It had no 
bearing on the relative treatment of constituent interests in the stan-
dard-setting process.238 This posture, taken together with the Concep-
tual Framework’s objectives of comparability across different prepar-
ers’ reports and consistency across time within a preparer’s reports, 
implied signiªcant constraints on management’s discretion to choose 
treatments (whether in view of a congenial bottom-line result or as 
the result of an internal cost-beneªt analysis).239 Based on decision 
usefulness, management would bear the burden of proof in justifying 
its favored treatments in FASB proceedings.240
 For the FASB, decision usefulness meant more than a normative 
choice between the markets and the preparers. It completed the pro-
ject of adopting the independent expertise model and foreclosing the 
pluralist alternative. Recall that the expertise model only works if the 
agency pursues an overriding goal.241 If the goal remains contestable, 
the agency ends up with the political task of accommodating conºict-
ing interests as it pursues multiple goals.242 Decision usefulness, left 
within the stewardship framework, would have cast the FASB into a 
world of multiple users with varied and conºicting preferences.243 
The FASB’s interest in maintaining its own independence foreclosed 
the possibility of a neutral approach to constituent interests.244
 Unsurprisingly, the FASB has adhered to decision usefulness over 
time. Its actors believe that so doing keeps them above politics.245 In 
their view, the FASB exists to produce consistent standards with a con-
ceptual underpinning.246 To take away the underpinning and open 
the ºoor to all legitimate concerns would pull it away from its mis-
sion.247 So far as the FASB is concerned, such an open-ended process 
would be better undertaken by a public agency.248
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 Note that the FASB can proceed above politics and hew to the in-
dependent expert model only because it made a political decision ex 
ante in its own Conceptual Framework. Unsurprisingly, staying above 
politics pursuant to a political strategy has meant endless political prob-
lems, as the succeeding Sections show.249 At the same time, the institu-
tional beneªts to the FASB have far exceeded the political costs. 
2. Policy Legitimacy 
 The Conceptual Framework’s embedding of decision usefulness 
as the standard-setting goal, however useful as a matter of agency de-
sign, would have availed the FASB nothing had it not also imported 
policy legitimacy. Fortunately for the FASB, it has done exactly that. 
 The preparers had more than historical precedent (and their 
own self-interest) going for them in advocating the goal of steward-
ship. They also had a powerful economic argument, which put a cost-
beneªt gloss on the pluralist, interest-balancing view of accounting 
standard setting.250 The argument stresses the costs of disclosure.251 
These include not only out-of-pocket compliance costs, but the poten-
tial for competitive disadvantage to the preparer and a wider discour-
agement of innovation and risk taking.252 As to a particular proposed 
standard, the more current the information reported, the more de-
tailed the report, the more focused on the proªtability of a narrow 
proªt line, and the smaller the number of outside interests ªnding 
the disclosure useful, the greater the likelihood that the disclosure 
implies competitive disadvantage and would fail to pass cost-beneªt 
scrutiny.253 Public values also come into play: because the requisite 
cost-beneªt judgments would necessarily be subjective, the legitimate 
standard setter would have to arrive at a “fair and equitable” balanc-
ing of interests.254 In this way, the preparers rolled together steward-
ship, pluralism, managerialism, and public welfare in a tidy package. 
 Based on decision usefulness, a two-part reply could be made for 
the FASB. First, information is a public good that will be underpro-
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vided absent regulation.255 More particularly, the standards reduce 
the social costs of information asymmetries, which include high trans-
action costs and thin capital markets with low liquidity.256 Although 
the capital markets certainly could function with low information, 
they would not be robust.257 With different investors having access to 
different levels of information, the fact that information shows in-
creasing returns to scale implies that some investors would be en-
dowed with monopolistic returns and other, less well-endowed inves-
tors would withdraw from the market.258 Bid-ask spreads would widen, 
transaction costs would rise, and volume would drop.259 The user-
based regime, in short, enhances allocative efªciency.260
 Second, absent a centralized standard setter producing user-
directed and mandated GAAP, reporting would suffer from the struc-
tural imbalances that otherwise impair the corporate governance sys-
tem.261 We have, after all, a situation of separated ownership and con-
trol. The users, as dispersed shareholders, have no incentive to pro-
duce standards.262 Indeed, absent centralized standards, a free rider 
problem would inhibit innovation by preparers and auditors and lead 
to underinvestment in standards.263 Finally, if the development of 
treatments were remitted to the joint discretion of preparers and 
auditors, management would have an advantage in getting rule inno-
vations to suit its interests, causing information asymmetries.264
 Taken together, the two justiªcations replicate those supporting 
the federal mandatory disclosure system. The FASB could not ask for 
a better defense than that,265 and could not have gotten by with any-
thing less. Note that at the same time the preparers’ cost-beneªt ar-
gument is countered without being confronted. 
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B. Management Opposition 
 Even as the FASB emerged as a plausible imitation of an exper-
tise-based, independent public agency, it differed in one signiªcant 
way. With a public agency, the elected legislature states the goal, im-
porting political as well as policy legitimacy at the outset.266 With the 
FASB, the founders delegated the goal-setting function to the agency 
itself.267 The FASB then set the goal with a view to its own institutional 
viability, while traversing the interests of a primary constituent.268 Un-
surprisingly, the preparers dissented and the goal failed to attain a 
general consensus.269 Dissent ripened into opposition when the FASB 
proceeded to take seriously its own independence and set an aggres-
sive agenda of standards reform.270 The preparers had signed on dur-
ing the 1970s, when the political environment made public standard 
setting by actors hostile to corporate interests a cognizable possibil-
ity.271 That threat receded after 1980, and with it management’s dis-
position to cooperate with the FASB.272
 The FASB made enemies in boardrooms with a trio of initiatives 
in the 1970s. First, it changed the rules on the recognition of loss con-
tingencies to block accruals before such time as the loss reasonably 
could be estimated.273 This inhibited management’s elbow room to 
indulge in the time-honored practice of smoothing income across ac-
counting periods.274 Second, taking a fair value point of view that was 
itself anathema to management, the FASB tightened the rules on 
portfolio securities and troubled loans, forcing the banks to take 
write-downs during a recessionary period.275 Third, the FASB went 
after the oil and gas industry, which had been happily capitalizing and 
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amortizing all drilling costs.276 The FASB wanted immediate and full 
cost write-offs.277 The industry argued that this would chill investment 
in exploration and applied political pressure that eventually resulted 
in an SEC limitation on the treatment’s application.278
 The FASB continued to anger corporate boards in the 1980s, 
when it addressed corporate obligations to retired employees under 
deªned beneªt pension plans.279 The FASB wanted these booked as 
balance sheet liabilities.280 The preparers resisted successfully, arguing 
that such a treatment would mean the end of employee pension bene-
ªts.281
 In the 1990s and 2000s, management stock options became the 
next hot button issue when the FASB proposed that the options’ eco-
nomic cost to the shareholders be assessed at fair value on the grant 
date and expensed over the vesting period.282 The preparers, again 
arguing that the reform would inhibit investment and innovation, re-
sisted in Congress, procuring a Senate resolution grounded in their 
pluralist, cost-beneªt view of ªnancial standard setting.283 The FASB, 
said the Senate, should confront the economic consequences of its 
proposed standards.284 A bill introduced contemporaneously would 
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have conditioned the effectiveness of new standards on an SEC major-
ity vote.285 The FASB backed down and shelved the project.286
 The FASB, setting its agenda independently in this way, has pur-
sued decision usefulness in disregard of constituent opposition. The 
preparers view this as a betrayal, a classic case of an unresponsive 
agency promulgating regulations for their own sake.287 Neither the 
FASB notice and comment process nor the FASAC advisory process 
has proved tractable for the preparers.288 They complain and get oc-
casional concessions, but the FASB continues to promulgate standards 
that they oppose.289 The preparers, however, do not argue for a public 
standard setter.290 They instead want to contain the private agency 
with an agenda control mechanism: an oversight board with power to 
block agenda items and force revision of existing standards.291 They 
have pressed for this at the FAF,292 at the SEC,293 and in Congress,294 
making the pluralist case for public accountability without success. 
Whether this implies a democratic deªcit is another question. The 
preparers hardly lack inºuence or political access. They have wielded 
their political muscle to block proposed standards, secured two of the 
FASB’s seven seats, and, at least for a while, procured a supermajority 
voting regime.295 Meanwhile, the FASB emerges from this four-decade 
back-and-forth with an enviable reputation for independence.296
C. Public Oversight 
 The relationship between a public agency and a delegated private 
standard setter has been usefully described in private contractual terms: 
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the public agency, like a ªrm, decides to “make or buy.”297 Buying 
makes sense if the value of the resources conserved through reliance 
on a private entity exceeds the relationship’s ancillary costs.298 The 
costs mount if the delegate’s incentives work at cross purposes with the 
agency’s pursuit of its public mission.299 If the delegate has an advan-
tage of information and expertise and the agency’s monitoring re-
sources are limited, then the agency can lose control of the outcome.300 
The undermonitored delegate can hold up its public principal.301
 If we ªll in the SEC as the principal and the FASB as the delegate, 
the result provides an excellent example of a successful public-to-
private contract. Two factors explain the success. The ªrst stems from 
the Conceptual Framework and decision usefulness. Together they 
effectively align the FASB’s institutional goal with the SEC’s mission of 
investor protection.302 Indeed, as between the two agencies, the FASB 
now is the better-aligned of the two. Under the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, SEC rulemaking now labors under 
the same marching orders that the preparers once sought for the 
FASB: the SEC is required to take “efªciency, competition, and capital 
formation” into account in addition to investor protection.303
 The alignment, thus set in theory, works in practice because the 
FASB’s appointments structure and rules of independence assure that 
its members pursue its formal mission rather than constituent or per-
sonal interests. The alignment makes the SEC useful to the FASB, as 
well as making the FASB useful to the SEC. To contain the FASB politi-
cally, the preparers must sustain the burden of an appeal to Congress, 
as the SEC has proved an uncongenial lobbying alternative on repeated 
occasions.304 The users, silently seconding the point, have remained 
quiescent throughout the FASB’s turbulent political history.305
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 The second factor in the success of the public-to-private contract 
between the SEC and the FASB is shared expertise.306 Although the 
SEC values the resources (both economic and political)307 saved by 
outsourcing the standard-setting function, it nonetheless makes a sig-
niªcant ongoing internal investment in accounting expertise.308 
Monitoring of the FASB’s agenda, priorities, and emerging positions 
by the SEC Ofªce of the Chief Accountant occurs in the ordinary 
course and proceeds cooperatively.309 The SEC’s accountants and the 
FASB announced a policy of mutual nonsurprise in 1974, and have 
since held to it.310 As in all effective principal-agent relationships, the 
principal also wields a big stick.311 The FASB’s authority depends on 
SEC certiªcation, and because the SEC maintains its own standard-
setting capacity, it can overrule the FASB by taking a matter into its 
own hands.312 It has done this rarely, however.313 The two most promi-
nent cases, the oil and gas drilling expense matter314 and accounting 
for inºation,315 occurred during the FASB’s early history, with con-
stituent pressure coming to bear both times.316 The most recent case 
of note, accounting for derivatives, involved an extended back-and-
forth on a complex matter, with the FASB proving responsive over 
time.317 In the more usual case, threats and suggestions sufªce to 
keep the two agencies’ agendas and priorities in synchrony.318
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D. Summary 
 The FASB and its founders sought to legitimate private standard 
setting by adopting the New Deal model of the independent, expert 
agency. Much like an independent public agency, they encountered a 
range of pluralist, public interest objections to the FASB’s exercises of 
regulatory discretion. But faithful adherence to the New Deal play-
book worked well in the long run. This happened in no small meas-
ure because the FASB put itself on history’s winning side with decision 
usefulness. It thereby aligned itself not only with the SEC, but also 
with the broader economic shift away from managerialism and toward 
capital market governance under the norm of shareholder value. 
III. Rules and Principles 
 This Part addresses the standards themselves. We have seen that 
the preparers’ lack of agenda control triggers the charge of “stan-
dards overload.”319 The preparers also complain of excessive complex-
ity, but only when they dislike the substance of the treatment under 
discussion.320 Complexity bothers them less when the substance is con-
genial.321 The complaint of excess complexity, as mooted more gen-
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erally, collapses into a third complaint: excessive use of rules.322 To-
day, all sides call for “principles-based” standards.323
 Rules-based standards seek to supply a clear answer to every pos-
sible situation, pursuing the objective with detailed statements, bright-
line tests, and multiple exceptions.324 Internal inconsistency often re-
sults.325 Comparability also suffers: reporting entities hewing to the 
same strict standard appear comparable on the basis of their ªnan-
cials when their arrangements in fact are dissimilar.326 Worse, say 
GAAP’s critics, the rules lead to transaction structuring and other 
strategic behavior that undermines the quality of ªnancial report-
ing.327 Financials that are manipulated in this way, although rule com-
pliant, do not truly and fairly state the reporting company’s income 
and ªnancial position.328
 The latter complaint rang loudly in the wake of the Enron scan-
dal. According to critics, rules-based treatments had been manipu-
lated by users and auditors and had resulted in reporting misstate-
ments.329 The rules had fostered a dysfunctional, check-the-box ap-
proach to compliance.330 Preparers and auditors applied the rules 
mechanically and ignored the substance of the transactions being re-
ported.331 The system had fostered a culture of noncompliance in 
which regulated actors invested in schemes of rule evasion.332 A prin-
ciples-based system, critics contended, would be less manipulable and 
thus superior.333 Congress concurred in passing SOX, which in-
structed the SEC to study the accounting system to ascertain the ex-
tent to which it is principles-based and to report on the length of time 
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needed to transition to a basis in principles.334 The resulting SEC 
Study conªrms the relative superiority of principles-based over rules-
based accounting and, following the historical pattern, hands the job 
of reconstructing GAAP back to the FASB.335
 This Part enters a dissenting opinion. GAAP has indeed become 
increasingly rules-based over time.336 This is not because general prin-
ciples no longer inºuence particular standards—the Conceptual 
Framework sets out general principles from which GAAP continues to 
follow loosely—but because the FASB’s constituents register demands 
for tailored treatments and the FASB often responds favorably.337 The 
pattern suggests capture, but also can be described as pluralist re-
sponsiveness. Either way, the substantive case against rules-based 
GAAP is not compelling.338 The FASB employs rules, despite their 
shortcomings, because they constrain preparer discretion, facilitate 
audits, and decrease the likelihood of scandals.339 These justiªcations 
still carry persuasive weight. 
A. Advantages and Disadvantages, Costs and Beneªts 
 This Section explores in the abstract whether GAAP should be 
articulated in rules or principles. To avoid the difªcult problem of 
clearly deªning the difference between the two, it ªrst describes the 
dynamic that brings rules into existence.340
 Assume that the standard setter has proposed a new principles-
based standard. The preparers then use the notice and comment proc-
ess to seek particular exceptions from the general principles. One 
means to this end is a “scope exception”: a rule that excludes stated 
transactions or items from a more general treatment category.341 
GAAP’s complex derivative rules provide a good example, with nine 
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exceptions to the deªnition of derivative, several of which came into 
the rules solely for the purpose of reducing preparation costs.342 Alter-
natively, preparers seek “treatment exceptions”: special rules for de-
ªned items or industry practices.343 Revenue recognition rules that fa-
cilitate income smoothing provide a prominent example.344 Having 
won their rule-based exceptions, the preparers (and their auditors) 
then request detailed instructions respecting implementation.345 The 
FASB responds, and GAAP becomes still more complex. 
1. The Case for Rules: Cost Savings, Compliance, and Transparency 
 Rules-based accounting entails cost savings.346 The cost savings 
follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards 
govern homogenous, recurrent situations where the actors need ex 
ante instructions and have incentives to invest in compliance.347 Such 
conditions tend to justify a rules-based approach.348 An across-the-
board shift to principles would make sense only if the costs of con-
stantly revising the rules to keep up with unintended applications due 
to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage outweighed the beneªts of 
advance speciªcation.349 GAAP does not appear to lie anywhere near 
that level of dysfunction. Under this analysis, the indicated course of 
reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules’ 
operation, periodically adjusting categories so that reporting results 
follow from the rules’ operative principles.350
 Compliance imports a second justiªcation for rules. Detailed rules 
provide roadmaps both for GAAP compliance and the identiªcation of 
noncompliance.351 The instructions provide a base of common as-
sumptions and knowledge for both preparers and auditors.352 Differ-
ences in measurement decrease as a result.353 Noncompliance becomes 
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more evident.354 And, as veriªcation becomes easier, the risk of audit 
failure decreases.355 Indeed, given a rule, the auditor who discovers 
noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let the matter pass.356 The 
rule provides a justiªcation for the refusal, minimizing potential dam-
age to the professional relationship between the auditor and the client. 
Since the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it also increases the 
ex post risk of SEC enforcement or civil liability respecting the preparer 
and the auditor, further strengthening the auditor’s resolve.357
 Transparency provides a third justiªcation. Detailed rules en-
hance transparency because their precise instructions narrow the 
room for differences of judgment.358 To understand this connection 
more clearly, revisit the legal realists’ case for principles over rules 
with respect to private law adjudication.359 That case presupposes that 
the law-to-fact application is explained and published in a judicial 
opinion. The reported cases give the practitioner an expanding body 
of fact-sensitive applications, ever better articulating the standard’s 
meaning. Over time, the accumulated case law offers the practitioners 
a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rule book, even as the 
principle’s ºexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thus the 
substance of the legal regime) are open for public inspection. The 
ongoing rules-based articulation of GAAP by the FASB works simi-
larly.360 But the application of open-ended accounting principles by 
preparers and auditors does not. Financial statements and footnotes 
are very summary documents. Decision making about treatments 
happens in a black box, evolving as a matter of practice amongst in-
siders. There is no comparable moment of transparency respecting 
the law-to-fact application, thereby diminishing the chance for outside 
evaluation. The law-to-fact applications, meanwhile, are not made by 
judges empowered by the state. They come from the preparers—the 
regulated actors themselves—acting with input from the auditor’s 
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professional review. And, when it comes to saying no, a professional, 
even one historically conceived to be in an adversary posture to its 
client, is in a materially different position from a judge. 
2. The Case for Principles: Flexibility and Professional Judgment 
 The case for principles arises in large measure from the descrip-
tion of the perverse effects of rules. The critics admit the force of the 
case for rules but assert that once rules come to dominate the ac-
counting regime, cumulative perverse effects cause disadvantages to 
outweigh advantages.361 The more detailed the set of exceptions, the 
greater the chance that essentially similar transactions receive differ-
ent accounting treatments.362 Scope and treatment exceptions build 
inconsistencies into the standards, sacriªcing the integrity of the un-
derlying principles.363 Strategic behavior results as preparers seek to 
exploit the inconsistencies, designing compliant transactions that sub-
vert the principles the rules supposedly effectuate.364 Meanwhile, pro-
liferating exceptions fuel additional demand for explication from the 
standard setter.365 The responsive standard setter ªnds itself attempt-
ing to articulate a treatment for every conceivable scenario.366 But the 
attempt always fails, for the goal of a perfect, exhaustive rule book is 
unattainable.367
 At this point, the case for principles reverses the case for rules. 
Since the standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situa-
tions ex ante, it is not clear why exhaustive instructions should be 
held out as a goal in the ªrst place, given that micro-level standard 
setting always results in inconsistencies.368 The only party with all in-
formation concerning a given transaction is the reporting company 
itself. It follows that its internal preparers, operating in good faith, are 
more likely to derive an appropriate treatment when applying a prin-
ciple than is a rulemaking standard setter acting ex ante. With princi-
ples, company-speciªc knowledge and the regulatory framework in-
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teract ºexibly, and the regulation’s purpose is more likely to be effec-
tuated.369
3. Summary 
 These back-and-forth arguments hold out costs and beneªts on 
both sides. Rules narrow discretion and prevent the appearance of 
ªrst-best ªnancial reports. Principles widen discretion, creating a 
danger of corruption.370 The answer to the question whether GAAP 
should be articulated in rules or principles thus depends on the in-
quirer’s further assumptions. If we hypothesize that preparers care 
only about ªdelity to accounting principles, and that audits proceed 
in an ideal professional environment in which the auditor works un-
constrained by pressures of time, price, and reputation, then the case 
for a principles-based regime is strong. But a plausible case for rules 
can be stated even under such conditions. This case strengthens ma-
terially if we assume that concerns about the bottom line shape pre-
parer incentives along with an imperfect professional relationship be-
tween the auditor and the preparer client, an assumption widely held 
in the present environment. 
B. The Demand for Rules 
 Agents of the FASB vigorously defend rules-based GAAP.371 Don-
ald Kirk, a founding member and one-time chair, once said that fair 
presentation does not in the end mean fairness because preparers 
always compete to ªnd advantageous ways to apply principles-based 
standards.372 The FASB’s agents also repeatedly cite constituent de-
mand.373 In the FASB’s view of the world, the same actor who argues 
for principles one day turns around the next to demand detailed 
“guidance” on a particular standard.374 And even as the FASB publicly 
embraces principles in the wake of demands registered after the En-
ron scandal, it simultaneously cautions that it does not entirely con-
trol the shape its standards take.375 Rather, the standards are in-
formed by reading comment letters, meeting with preparer represen-
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tatives, and talking with auditors.376 The FASB thus sees itself as a re-
sponsive regulator as it tends towards rules. 
1. Auditors, Clients, and Plaintiffs 
 We have seen that preparers petition the FASB for scope and 
treatment exceptions.377 But the rules mostly proliferate due to the pe-
titions of auditors, which pull the standard setter into multitudinous 
small issues.378 Client relations motivate this in part. Auditors dislike 
saying no because audit clients resist naysaying. Absent a precise written 
justiªcation, they balk at auditor objections to their treatments: “Show 
me where it says I can’t do this.”379 The auditor therefore seeks the 
backing of a precise negative instruction in GAAP before objecting.380 
The rule insulates the auditor’s professional judgment from the client’s 
negative response and ªxes blame on the external authority. Given a 
rule, the auditor also can assure the client that competing ªrms will not 
sign off on its ªnancials either.381
 The audit profession’s fear of enforcement entanglement, in par-
ticular civil liability, strengthens the preference.382 With an open-
ended principle, both the preparer and the auditor must make a judg-
ment respecting a law-to-fact application.383 Risk-averse actors in this 
posture will be wary of second-guessing by regulatory authorities and 
plaintiff’s lawyers.384 The good faith with which they apply the princi-
ple will be unveriªable ex post. Principles, then, make it hard to mini-
mize enforcement risk. 
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2. Secondary Capture 
 Rules often are said to evidence auditor rent seeking. If this is 
true, then what the FASB describes as responsiveness to constituent 
demands can be described as a species of capture. 
 The auditor rent extraction point follows from a public choice 
description of perverse effects resulting from the enactment of the 
federal securities laws. Before 1933, nothing required publicly traded 
ªrms to undergo independent audits.385 Nor were there any formally 
designated, generally accepted accounting principles, much less a 
standard setter.386 The federal securities laws broke the pattern by re-
quiring an independent audit for registered companies.387 This made 
the large audit ªrms providers of a necessary professional service and 
positioned them to collect rents.388 Complex, rules-based standards 
aid and abet the rent seeking. Complexity by itself generates work.389 
It also strengthens entry barriers: over time, fewer and fewer audit 
ªrms possess the technical resources necessary for engagements with 
large clients.390 Indeed, the number of such ªrms has fallen to four.391 
Innovation, moreover, is choked off to the extent that it decreases 
auditability and exposes the ªrms to legal risk.392
 The account is persuasive as a structural matter: the auditors 
have gatekeeping power and are not incented to demand ªrst-best 
GAAP. But there are some qualiªcations. Audit ªrms engage in price 
competition despite their diminishing numbers.393 The price of audit 
services fell in the 1980s in the wake of the federal push for increased 
competition in service provision by professionals.394 Audit quality fell 
                                                                                                                      
385 See Van Riper, supra note 16, at 6. 
386 See id. at 5. 
387 Id. at 6. 
388 See Benston, supra note 381, at 1329–31. 
389 See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A Synthesis, 19 J. Acct. Res. 227, 231 (1981); 
see also Mundstock, supra note 29, at 817 (charging that the FASB’s standards justify high 
fees in exchange for little work and low legal risk and that its innovations never impair the 
rent ºow to auditors). 
390 See Dale Buckmaster et al., Measuring Lobbying Inºuence Using the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board Public Record, 20 J. Econ. & Soc. Measurement 331, 340 (1994). 
391 Shyam Sunder, Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing 18 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for 
Fin., Working Paper No. 03–17, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=413581. 
392 See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 831. Advocates of expanded fair value accounting 
are particularly likely to make this claim. 
393 See Sunder, supra note 391, at 18–20. 
394 See id. at 20. 
46 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 48:5 
with it.395 To see why, hypothesize the incentives of an audit partner 
under pricing pressure. The audit process begins with an appraisal of 
the client’s risk of compliance failure.396 The auditor’s professional 
judgment concerning the scope of the testing conducted during the 
course of the audit follows from this risk appraisal.397 The scope of the 
testing in turn affects the audit fee—as the risk increases, more tests 
are needed, more time must be spent, and the fee rises. In this sce-
nario, “check-the-box” rules recommend themselves over principles in 
a hard cash sense because they make companies easier to audit. They 
enhance veriªability, causing differences in measurement to decrease 
and making noncompliance more evident.398 The audit becomes 
faster and more predictable, making it easier to state a price in ad-
vance and lock in a proªt on the engagement. Contrast this rules-
based approach with a regime of principles requiring the preparer to 
make fact-sensitive applications of the standards. This necessitates a 
more labor-intensive audit in which unexpected and time-consuming 
problems are more likely to arise. In sum, price competition for pro-
fessional services fuels the demand for rules. 
 At least one empirical study has examined the effects of audit 
ªrm lobbying on the FASB’s decision-making process.399 The study 
found that audit ªrms indeed comment on proposed rules from their 
own perspectives rather than those of their clients.400 Moreover, the 
FASB is more likely to change a rule in response to auditor, rather 
than preparer, protest.401 This result disappears, however, when alter-
native methodologies are used.402 Nor does a statistical ªnding of re-
sponsiveness necessarily imply inºuence. The record may merely re-
ºect the fact that preparers and auditors tend to comment on differ-
ent aspects of the same standards.403 The preparers are more likely to 
object to a standard’s very existence or general purposes, matters 
high on the FASB’s substantive agenda; auditors comment on matters 
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of technical implementation that are less likely to implicate strong 
preferences among the members.404
3. Summary 
 Intense demand for rules can be expected to persist and rent 
seeking by the audit profession ªgures into the demand. That said, 
auditor rents do not necessarily ªgure into the FASB’s pattern of posi-
tive response. Rules can be justiªed independently on a principled 
basis. 
C. Rules and Scandals 
 The oft-voiced claim that rules-based GAAP caused recent ac-
counting scandals is largely unfounded.405 This is not because GAAP 
contains no manipulable rules; it does. Nor is this because the rules 
have not been manipulated; they have been. Rather, it is because re-
cent corporate scandals and high-proªle reporting failures for the 
most part did not stem from rule manipulation. 
 Those who denounce GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a 
number of subject matters. These core, rules-based regimes include 
accounting for derivatives and hedging activity, leasing, real estate 
sales, stock-based compensation arrangements, consolidation (or 
other recognition) of related entity ªnancial assets and liabilities, and, 
prior to reforms instituted in 2002,406 mergers and acquisitions.407 
The General Accounting Ofªce’s (the “GAO’s”) study of public com-
pany accounting restatements permits us to gauge the extent to which 
these rules-based subjects ªgure into the spate of audit failures, ac-
counting restatements being the results of audit failures.408 The study 
shows that the annual number of restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to 
225 in 2001.409 From January 1997 to June 2002, the total number of 
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restatements announced was 919.410 These involved 845 companies, 
amounting to 10% of all of those listed on public exchanges in the 
United States.411 Issues involving revenue recognition, whether in re-
spect of misreported or nonreported revenue, made up the largest 
group by subject matter category, accounting for almost 38% of the 
919 restatements.412 The second largest group concerned cost- or ex-
pense-related issues, accounting for almost 16%.413 The GAAP reve-
nue and cost recognition standards bearing on this 54% majority 
group are for the most part principles-based—they are phrased in 
general terms and require signiªcant exercises of judgment in their 
application.414
 The remaining restatements cover a range of subject matter, 
some of it rules-based, but most of it principles-based. On the rules-
based side are restatements concerning merger and acquisition ac-
counting and derivatives.415 Skewing toward the principles-based side 
we ªnd restatements involving in-process research and development, 
related party transactions, loan-loss reserves and loan write-offs, asset 
impairment, inventory valuation, and restructuring activity.416
 There is a simple reason why rules-based subject matters do not 
dominate the list: rule compliance is more easily veriªed than princi-
ple compliance.417 As we have seen, detailed rules hold out roadmaps 
both to GAAP compliance and to the identiªcation of GAAP non-
compliance.418 Observers who disapprove of the rules-based treat-
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ments419 dislike the reporting destinations to which the roadmaps 
lead. Since these destinations tend to be favored by the preparers, 
their managers happily comply with the rules. At the same time, a 
noncomplying preparer is more likely to confront an uncooperative 
auditor. 
 There can be no denying that preparers often take advantage of 
GAAP’s rule structures when they design aggressive treatments. Regu-
latory arbitrage (the practice of structuring an inappropriate transac-
tion so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule) clearly is wide-
spread. But these aggressive rule manipulations, which tend to involve 
structured ªnance, leases, and (until recently) pooled mergers, do 
not show up in large numbers on the list of recent restatements. 
 The audit failures and restatements follow less from regulatory 
arbitrage than from strategic noncompliance—action taken based on 
an interpretation of the law in conºict with the stated interpretation 
of the regulator.420 Neither rules nor standards prevent such conduct, 
and, as between the two, rules have the advantage in deterring it.421 
Meanwhile, in every restatement case, GAAP by deªnition has proved 
adequate to the job of identifying the misstatement and providing 
corrective instructions. Under this analysis, the drafters of SOX were 
right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed to the 
crisis, but wrong in ascribing the problem to the standard setter. This 
is not for the most part a problem concerning the relative merits of 
rules and principles in standard setting; it is a problem of compliance 
and professional practice in a regulatory system made up of both. 
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Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275, 1305–09, 1314–1320 (2002). It is true that 
misleading accounting treatments of transactions between Enron and off-balance-sheet 
entities lie at the scandal’s core, and that the applicable accounting standards are rules-
based. See id. at 1305–09. Indeed, the form-over-substance treatments of these rules are as 
notoriously arbitrary as any in GAAP. But, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the cen-
tral problem at Enron lay not with the rules themselves, but with the company’s failure to 
follow them. See id. at 1342. The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules’ structural 
shortcomings, but from the corruption of Enron’s managers and perverse ªnancial incen-
tives that inclined its auditor towards cooperation. Id. at 1305–09, 1314–20. 
421 See supra notes 351–357 and accompanying text. 
50 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 48:5 
D. The SEC Intervention 
 There is, then, no foundation for the proponents’ belief that 
principles by themselves solve compliance problems. The recent his-
tory of audit failure has been no respecter of principles. The case for 
principles accordingly returns us to the auditor-client relationship to 
inquire into preparers’ incentives and the quality of auditors’ profes-
sional judgments. If recent history is predictive, the prognosis is not 
good. The preparers have been guided by short-term solicitude for 
their own stock prices rather than by ªdelity to accounting principles, 
and the auditors have been disinclined to stop them. It will take more 
than a new approach to standard setting to bring incentive compati-
bility to this context. 
 The SEC attempts to negotiate this problem in its report under 
SOX by taking a split-the-difference approach that it calls “objectives-
oriented.”422 As an exemplar, it offers the FASB’s recent revision of 
the standard for mergers.423 Here is the SEC’s description of a princi-
ples-based system: 
[T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard involves 
a concise statement of substantive accounting principle 
where the accounting objective has been incorporated as an 
integral part of the standard and where few, if any, excep-
tions or internal inconsistencies are included in the stan-
dard. Further, such a standard should provide an appropri-
ate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of 
the class of transactions or events and should be devoid of 
bright-line tests. Finally, such a standard should be consistent 
with, and derive from, a coherent conceptual framework of 
ªnancial reporting.424
This takes a step back from the base case for principles. The princi-
ples-based approach relies on the preparer to make a good faith ap-
plication of the open standard to particular facts and assumes that a 
successful system depends on exercises of professional judgment by 
                                                                                                                      
422 SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C. For additional comments on the SEC interven-
tion, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Interpreting the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based” Sys-
tems in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting (2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on ªle with author). In Cunningham’s view, the SEC’s “objectives-oriented” stan-
dards are nothing more than GAAP’s prevailing mix of rules and standards. Id. 
(manuscript at 52–57). 
423 SEC Report, supra note 322, §§ I.C, I.E. 
424 Id. § I.C. 
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auditors and preparers who are motivated by ªdelity to the goal of fair 
representation.425 The SEC removes this stress on the regulated ac-
tors’ responsibility for law-to-fact determinations by endorsing the le-
gitimacy of constituent demands for speciªcity.426 It then shifts a bur-
den of speciªcity back to the standard setter to provide “an appropri-
ate amount of implementation guidance.”427 Bald statements of 
principles, says the SEC, provide preparers and auditors insufªcient 
structure in which to frame their professional judgment.428 The “prin-
ciples” need to be “deªned speciªcally.”429
 The SEC does not entirely abandon the objectives of principles-
based standards, however.430 Its projected regime appears to hold out 
the beneªt of a decrease in the level of reporting detail.431 At the 
same time, comparability of treatment across different issuers would 
be enhanced through the avoidance of scope and treatment excep-
tions.432 But the decrease in complexity implies a concomitant loss of 
transparency, since commonality of treatment obscures particulars in 
the economics of differing underlying transactions.433 Relevance, reli-
ability, and comparability become matters to be traded off by the 
standard setter in a balancing exercise.434 At the bottom line, says the 
SEC, economic substance should drive the development and scope of 
the standards.435
 Although this sounds plausible, a question must be asked: How 
does the regime envisaged simultaneously articulate precise instruc-
tions and eschew all exceptions from its categories? So doing would 
amount to a considerable achievement. The drawing of lines is intrin-
sic to regulation. Line drawing is what case law under principles is 
supposed to do. It is not at all clear that ªnancial reporting standards 
                                                                                                                      
425 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 61; see also Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 148–49 (2002) 
(prepared statement of Sir David Tweedie, Chairman, International Accounting Standards 
Board) (describing the European system); Mundstock, supra note 29, at 844 (suggesting 
that principles-based standards will be favored by preparers). 
426 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § I.C. 
427 Id. 
428 Id. 
429 Id. 
430 See id. § IV.D. 
431 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § IV.D. 
432 See id. §§ I.C, IV.D. 
433 The comments in the text draw on FASB, Principles Approach, supra note 360, at 
7. 
434 See SEC Report, supra note 322, § III.C. 
435 Id. 
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differ from any other body of regulation in this regard. So, to the ex-
tent that the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all standards 
mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disap-
pointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any 
other regulatory context.436
 The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards 
that incorporate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the 
rubric of principles-based accounting. The system envisioned more 
accurately would be characterized as one of tough, general rules.437 
Such a regime would have advantages. For example, it presumably 
would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments tolerated in re-
cent years, particularly those facilitating income smoothing. But if this 
is what the SEC has in mind, another question arises: In the present 
political and institutional context, how likely is it that the preparers, 
their auditors, and their friends in Washington would permit the 
FASB to use the rubric of principles-based accounting to usher in a 
new era of strict treatments? Looking at the four-decade history sur-
veyed above, the answer must be: very unlikely. 
 As a practical matter, then, if the SEC is serious about this move 
to principles, then preparer and auditor judgments will matter more 
in the future. The SEC acknowledges this when it warns that princi-
ples-based accounting implicates a more expensive, time-consuming 
audit process.438 It anticipates that, in order to review preparer judg-
ments, audit ªrms will have to hire expensive personnel with exper-
tise in complex transactions.439 It also anticipates that the system will 
require active audit committee oversight and other strong enforce-
ment agents.440 Finally, it advises auditors and preparers to generate 
extensive paper records respecting treatment decisions, so as to posi-
tion themselves to defend their good faith.441 We get principles, then, 
but no reliance on those applying them. 
 At the bottom line, the SEC is asking the users to trust that the 
creation of the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
                                                                                                                      
436 See FASB, Principles Approach, supra note 360, at 6. 
437 The FASB’s 2002 proposal in effect warns audit ªrms and issuers of this when it 
points out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earnings ªgures. See id. at 
7–8. 
438 See SEC Report, supra note 322, §§ I.C, I.I, V.H. 
439 See id. § I.I. 
440 Id. § III.J. 
441 Id. 
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(the “PCAOB”)442 effects a shift to a robust compliance regime. The 
question is whether this better, more principles-based world can be 
realized without unintended negative effects due to poor professional 
judgment. 
E. Summary 
 The public-private distinction helps to explain the connection 
between the standards’ form and the audit process. The FASB, by con-
joining agency independence and substantive alignment with the user 
interest, traverses the interests of a key constituent: corporate man-
agement. This has a negative consequence. For the self-regulatory re-
porting system to work well, management must internalize the spirit 
of the standards and cooperate fully with the audit ªrms. It has done 
neither, and the standards’ form has been skewed as a result. No one, 
however, suggests the corrective of reconstituting the standard setter 
along pluralist lines. We have instead chosen to regulate the auditors. 
The PCAOB has the job of ameliorating the cooperation problem by 
forcing the audit ªrms to reject aggressive preparer treatments. If the 
PCAOB succeeds at this, then, and only then, will the FASB be free to 
move toward principles. 
Conclusion 
 The FASB’s variant on the New Deal agency model remains ro-
bust. Privately constituted, but now publicly funded, the FASB is more 
independent than ever. It may be second best, but nobody seems able 
to suggest something better. Public interest advocates would remove 
ªnancial standard setting to a government agency. That would suc-
ceed in getting a new hearing for substantive views that have not 
found favor at the FASB. But it is by no means clear that better stan-
dards would result. Public choice theorists propose the more radical 
alternative of deregulating GAAP by leaving the development of stan-
dards to preparers and auditors operating in spontaneous order. But 
turning back the clock to 1929 presents signiªcant risks and therefore 
has little practical appeal. 
                                                                                                                      
442 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(c) (Supp. III 2003). Under 
SOX, the PCAOB is not a U.S. government agency, but a private organization with a gov-
ernmental mandate. Id. § 101(b). For the view that the PCAOB should be considered a 
U.S. government agency for due process purposes, see generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing 
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 975 (2005). 
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